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APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
All parties involved in this appeal are included in 
this caption. As of this date, Floyd J. Rigby, Ray all and 
Rimaras, Inc. are not parties to the appeal. Anna R. Fleischmann 
is Defendant-Appellant. Robert G. Garland and Mary Garland are 
Plaintiffs and should be Respondents. 
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JURISDICTION 
The jurisdiction of this appeal is from the Court of 
general trial jurisdiction, to-wit: The District Court of 
Garfield County, Utah, to the Supreme Court of the State of 
Utah. The jurisdiction of this item comes from Rule D of the 
Utah Rules of the Supreme Court in which it has specific 
authority to appeal this item to the Utah Supreme Court. The 
final rjght is the basis on which this is appealed from the final 
judgment and order effecting title of land in the State of Utah. 
The appeal as a matter of right is from the Sixth Judicial 
District Court of Garfield County, State of Utah, to the Supreme 
Court of the State of Utah under the provisions of Rule 9 (a) 
of the Rules of the Supreme Court. A copy of the Judgment appealed 
from is attached hereto. The Court turned jurisdiction of this 
matter under the date of the 22nd day of December, 1988, in the 
form of a pleading, "Pursuant to the authority vested in this 
Court, these cases are poured-over to the Court of Appeals for 
disposition. All further pleadings and correspondence should be 
directed to that Court. Their address is 230 South 500 East, 
Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102." This pleading was 
signed by Geoffrey J. Butler, as Clerk of the Supreme Court of 
the State of Utah. It is presumed by the undersigned that this 
pour-over by the Supreme Court oi the State of Utah to the Utah 
Court of Appeals confirms jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals 
of the State of Utah. 
_4_ 
ISSUES 
There are several issues presented on this particular 
item, to-wit. 
1. Plaintiffs are squatters with nothing but possession 
by consent of officers of the Corporation that owns the 
property. 
2. The conditional sale agreement on other land is 
insufficient indicia of title on which to base a quiet 
title action. 
3. Can a land description in a conditional sale 
contract be change by parol evidence for use as indicia 
of title for a quiet title action over objection and over 
the statute of frauds? 
4. What is color of title for purposes of a quiet 
title action? 
5. What is seven years* taxes for purposes of a 
quiet title action? 
6. Was this a permitted use rather than an adverse 
use? 
ST^TUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES 
1. Title 78-12-7: 
11
 Adverse possession—Possession presumed in owner. 
In every action lor the recovery ol real property, or 
the possession thereof, the person establishing a 
legal title to the property shall be presumed to have 
been possessed thereot within the time required by law; 
and the occupation of the property by any other person 
shall be deemed to have been under and in subordination 
to the legal title, unless it appears that the property 
has been held and possessed adversely to such legal 
title for seven years before the commencement of the 
action. " 
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2. Title 78-12-7.1 
1
 Adverse Possession—Presumption—Proviso — 
Tax title.—In every action for the recovery or 
possession of real property or to quiet title to or 
deterimine the owner thereof the person establishing 
a legal title to such property shall be presumed to 
have been possessed thereof within the time required 
by law; and the occupation of such property by any 
other person shall be deemed to have been under and 
in subordination to the legal title, unless it appears 
that such property has been held and possessed 
adversely to such legal title for seven years before 
the commencement of such action. Provided, however, 
that if in any action any party shall establish prima 
facie evidence that he is the owner of any real 
property under a tax title held by him and his pre-
decessors for four years prior to the commencement of 
such action and one year after the effective date of 
this amendment he shall be presumed to be the owner of 
such property by adverse possession unless it appears 
that the owner of the legal title or his predecessor 
has actually occupied or been in possession of such 
property under such title or that such tax title 
owner and his predecessors have failed to pay all the 
taxes levied or assessed upon such property within 
such four-year period.ff 
3. Title 78-12-12. 
"Possession must be continuous, and taxes paid.— 
In no case shall adverse possession be considered 
established under the provision of any section of this 
code, unless it shall be shown that the land has been 
occupied and claimed for the period of seven years 
continuously, and that the party, his predecessors 
and grantors have paid all taxes which have been 
levied and assessed upon such land according to law." 
4. Title 78-12-5.1: 
"Seizure or possession within seven years—Proviso — 
Tax title.—No action for the recovery of real property 
or for the possession thereof shall be maintained, unless 
the plaintiff or his predecessor was seized or possessed 
such property within seven years from the commencement 
of such action; provided, however, that with respect 
to actions or defenses brought or interposed for the 
recovery or possession of or to quiet title or deter-
mine the ownership of real property against the holder 
of a tax title to such property, no such action or 
defense shall be commenced or interposed more than 
four years after the date of the tax deed, conveyance, 
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or transfer creating such tax titie unless the person 
commencing or interposing such action or defense or 
his predecessor has actually occupied or been in 
possession of such property within four years prior 
to the commencement or interposition of such action 
or defense or within one year i rorn the effective 
date of this amendment." 
This is definitely a case of statutory interpretation, 
and it is a question of law. There probably is very little 
controversy as to the fact situation. 
The Plaintiffs-Respondents brought this case against 
several Defendants including the Defendant-Appellant Fleischmann 
who claims title to the land. The second and third causes of 
action were primarily damage J terns which did not apply to the 
Dei'endan t-Appe L Lan t Fleischmann and were dismissed as to every 
one else. Statements were made before trial that they did not 
apply to Miss Fleischmann. Plaintiffs-Respondents claimed 
title to the property based upon adverse possession on a verbal 
agreement with officers of Rimaras, Inc. who did not own the 
property but said that they could occupy the same in this 
fashion, this is permissive use when the property belonged to 
Rimaras, Inc. and was consented to by officers of Rimaras, Inc. 
at the time Rimaras, Inc. owned the land. The Defendant-
Appellant claims title and occupation upon being the successor 
in interest to the record title holder by virtue of a judicial 
sale. This matter was fried before the District Court of 
Garfield County, Utah, which awarded specific title to the 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, with findings to the effect that said 
Plaintiffs-Respondents were there by right of possession. The 
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Judgment Order dated the 21st day of October, 1988, filed in the 
District Court of Garfield County, Utah, on the 26th day of 
October, 1988, started an appeal process with a Notice of Appeal 
being filed in the District Court of Garfield County, Utah, on 
the 18th day of November, 1988, and filed by the Clerk of the 
Supreme Court of Utah on the 21st day of November, 1988. 
From the factual situation, the Plaintiffs-Respondents 
did business with Defendants Rigby and Hall in their own 
capacity in 1980. At that time, Plaintiffs-Respondents entered 
into an Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase on a printed 
form. Riby and Hall agreed to sell to Plaintiffs-Respondents 
Garland Lot #126, Tommy Creek Subdivision, Garfield County, Utah. 
This receipt is attached hereto or a photosat of the same. A 
photostatic copy was entered into evidence and is the nearest 
to indicia of title that the Plaintiffs-Respondents can produce. 
It does not say anything about Lot #128. It says in substance 
and effect Lot #126 and that Plaintiffs-Respondents may change 
to Lot #127 or Lot #41. It might be interpreted to say that any 
lot between #127 and #41 could be picked by Plaintiffs-Respondents. 
Lot #128 does not come under either category. Defendants Rigby 
and Hall never owned the property in question which is Lot #128. 
As officers of Rimaras,Inc., Defendants Rigby and Hall obtained 
title to Lot #128 in the name of Rimaras, Inc. and did not record 
the deed and did not deliver the deed to Plaintiffs-Respondents 
until later. It was recorded after about one year from the time 
of the transaction between Defendants Rigby and Hall and the 
Plaintiffs-Respondents. Both Defendants Rigby and Hall were 
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officers of Rimaras, Inc. and are now officers of Rimaras, Inc. 
This was true at the time of the transaction and is true at the 
present and at all times inbetween. 
On the 3rd day of January, 1985, in the District Court 
of Iron County, Utah, the Defendant-Appellant obtained a money 
judgment against Rimaras, Inc for the sum of $17,066.12, plus 
$54.50 in costs. A judgment was filed in Iron County, Utah, 
on that date. The transcript of this judgment from Iron County, 
Utah was filed in the Garfield County Clerk's office on or about 
the 6th day of July, 1985. As of that date, Lot #128 was in the 
name of Rimaras, Inc. and had considerable taxes over due on the 
same. Tax notices were sent to Rimaras, Inc., and were trans-
mitted by Defendants Hall and Rigby to the Plaintiffs-Respondents 
for the years 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, and 1985. Taxes were 
paid by the Plaintiffs-Respondents in the spring of 1986. In 
November, 1987, the Plaintiffs-Respondents paid the 1987 taxes 
on Lot #128. In September, 1987, the Defendant-Appellant 
Fleischmann by and through her representative had execution 
taken on the judgment. The execution together with a praecipe 
was sent to the Sheriff of Garfield County, Utah, listing the 
usual items of sale, to-wit: Personal property and then real 
property. The praecipe specifically requested that if the 
execution was not answered by other property items then the 
interest of Rimaras, Inc. in Lot #128, Tommy Creek Subdivision, 
Mammoth Creek Ranchetts in Garfield County, Utah, be sold. 
Garfield County Sheriff levied on Lot #128 and 
noticed the same for sale on the 11th day of January, 1988, in 
accordance with the statutes of the State of Utah. On the date 
of said sale, the sale was attended by Patrick H. Fenton as 
attorney for Defendant-Appellant and by Michael W. Park as 
attorney for Plaintiffs-Respondents. At said sale, Michael W. 
Park announced that he was there as a representative of the 
Plaintiffs-Respondents and that Plainti f fs-Respondents claimed 
possession. The sale went forward, and the Defendant-Appellant 
Fieischmann was the bidder. She purchased said Lot #128 for 
$10,000. Since that time, the Sheriff of Garfield County, Utah, 
has issued a Sheriff's Deed to the DeLendant-Appellant Fieischmann. 
Said deed has been recorded due to the failure of Rimaras, Inc. 
or anyone else holding title under Rimaras, Inc. to redeem. A 
Certificate of Sale was issued on the 11th day of January, 1988; 
it was recorded on that date. After the commencement of the 
action, the Defendant-Appellant Fieischmann by and through her 
agents ascertained that the 1986 taxes were not paid on Lot 
#128, said agents for Defendant-Appellant Fieischmann paid said 
taxes. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
It is the Defendant-Appellant Fieischmann?s position 
that she obtained title to the property by virtue of the judicial 
sale. The Plaintiffs-Respondents Garland never had adverse 
possession by and for the reason that they entered the property 
believing it to be the property of the Defendants Rigby and 
Hall and they wore entering WJ th their- consent. Later when 
Plaintifts-Respondents Garland iound out that it was the 
property of Rimaras, Inc., they entered the property with the 
consent of the Defendants Rigby and Hall, the two principal 
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officers of Rimaras, Inc. Under these conditions, there can be 
no adverse possession but the occupation was by consent. This 
occupation was by mistake caused by misrepresentation, but at 
no time was it intentional adverse possession by Plaintiffs-
Respondents. In addition, Plaintiffs-Respondents have not 
complied with statutory requirements for adverse possession in 
the following respects: 
1. Plaintiffs-Respondents have no indicia of title 
having only a carbon copy of a conditional sale contract on 
other property and not the subject property of this action. 
2. Plaintiffs-Respondents have not paid seven years1 
taxes, having admittedly not paid the 1986 taxes and having paid 
five years be Core that and the 1987 taxes. The 1988 taxes were 
not due at the time of trial. 
Under these conditions, adverse possession has not been 
met out. Defendant-Appellant Fleischmann is entitled to the 
property by virtue of the execution deed. 
ARGUMENTS 
1. What is adverse possession? 
In the first place to create adverse possession, 
we have to overcome Title 78-12-7 which has been quoted and stated 
above. It is the Defendant-Appellant's contention that this puts 
the Defendant-Appellant in possession of the property as successor 
in interest of Rimaras, Inc. by virtue of an execution sale. This 
particular statute gives a presumption of the person establishing 
legal title to the property shall be presumed to have been 
possessed thereof within the time required by law, and the occupa-
tion of such property is in subordination of this occupation of 
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Defendant-Appellant Fleisehmann. There is no question as to the 
legal title being in the Oofondnnt-Appe11 ant Fleisehmann as is 
shown in the transcript in the testimony of Thomas V. Hatch, 
beginning on page 33 at line 16 of the transcript of testimony 
and running through to page 38, line 21. This shows legal title 
under Rimaras, Inc. and by virtue of the sheriff's sale to the 
Defendant-Appellant Fleischmann. Under these conditions, this 
puts the provisions of Title 78-12-7, Utah Code Annotated, (1953, 
as amended), squarely into consideration of this particular 
matter as to establishing legal title and the right of possession. 
It is uncontested that legal title has been in Rimaras, Inc. 
since 1982, and came into them promptly by virtue of a deed that 
takes back legal title to the I960 period and ends up in 
Rimaras, Inc. By virtue of the sheriff's sale, legal title is 
in the Defendant-Appellant Fleischmann. The sheriff's sale 
shows in the title information, title records in the transcript, 
page 37, line 22 and the remainder of that page and several pages 
preceeding thereto, which shows the title to run from Mrs. Jensen 
to Mr. and Mrs. Allen and a change of name on Mrs. Allen and a 
deed from Mrs. Allen in her later name to Rimaras, Inc. The 
transfer irom Rimaras, Inc. to the Defendant-Appellant Fleischmann 
is by virtue of the sheriff's sale; this is shown on page 37 
of the transcript. The recording to Rimaras, Inc. is shown on 
page 36 of the transcript, at line 6; it is shown to have taken 
place on July 14, 1981. 
At this time it seems appropriate that there should be 
some discussion in this matter as to what is adverse possession. 
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In the case of Home OwnerT s Loan Corp. v. Dudley, 105 Utah 208, 
141 P.2d 160,1943, there was considerable discussion on this 
point. There was quite a discussion on what adverse possession 
is. That case indicates that adverse possession can only be 
acquired in accordance with the exact provisions of the statutes 
requiring the adverse possession to be for a continuous period 
of time during which claimant is in possession and has paid all 
taxes levied and levied on that particular property. At that 
time we were talking about Title 104-2-7 to 104-2-12. We are 
now talking about Title 78-12-7 to 78-12-12, to include 78-12-
12.1. These last items refer to Utah Code Annotated, (1953, as 
amended.) Adverse possession is interpreted and how it is 
acquired. It refers specifically to the statutory provisions of 
adverse possession and acquiring title by such method. Paying 
taxes and items of this nature are discussed in great ramifica-
tion in the Home OwnerT s Loaji__Co£P.i jy_- J^u^l_eZ c a s e ancl the 
various cases that have used it for authority ever since. In 
that particular case, adverse possession was allowed by the trial 
court and reversed by the Supreme Court of the State of Utah. 
This has been held as a leading case for many years since that 
time including the present time. This case specifically limits 
adverse possession to the statutory method. It specifically 
holds that the statute has to be complied with and there has to 
be possession for the required period of time plus the payment 
of taxes. This doctrine was upheld by the Utah Supreme Court as 
late as 1987 in the case of ^oyal__Street Land Company v. Reed, 
739 P.2d 1104. This was also upheld in the case of United Park 
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City Mines Company v. CI egg, 737 P.2d 173, 1987, Cases upholding 
this doctrine in the appellate court system of the State of Utah 
between Home Owner's Loan Corp. v. Dudley ease and the later eases 
above quoted indicate approximately 30 cases as cLted in ShepardTs 
Citations. 
2. There was never any adverse possession. 
It is admitted by all parties at all times that officers 
of Rimaras, Inc. had actual knowledge to the occupation of the 
premises by the Plaintiffs-Respondents and consented to the same. 
Under these conditions, there can be no adverse possession 
where you have conented occupation and this is known by all 
parties. Exhibit #3, as identiJied by the Plaintiffs-Respondents 
was a conditional sale contract for other property although it 
was signed by Mr. Hall and Mr. Rigby. This is claimed by the 
Plaintiffs-Respondents to be their indicia oi title and is the 
only item that has been olJered as indicia oi title. It refers 
to Lot #127 or in the alternative, Lots #127 or #41. To torture 
this into saying Lot #128 is allowing us to change a written 
agreement by parol testimony and is in violation of the statute 
of frauds. This was objected to at the time on that basis. Page 
10 of the transcript shows that the agreement is identified as 
Exhibit #3, which is apparently a carbon copy of a conditional 
sales contract, describes Lot #127. Further on Page 10 commenc-
ing on line 19, there is talk about changing it. There seems 
to be no question that Mr. Hall, Mr. Rigby and the Plaintiffs-
Respondents d ] ci make some verbal agreement pertaining to Lot 
#128. However, they did not change the written agreement. 
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Through Page 11 of the transcript there is discussion of this 
and reference is made as to the statute ot frauds on line 10 
oi Page 11. On page 13 commencing with line 3, over objection 
the Plaintiffs-Respondents were allowed to testify that they 
talked to Mr. Hall and Mr. Rigby about changing lots to Lot 
#128 with the consent ot Mr. Hall and Mr. Rigby. Mr. Rigby 
actually cleared the area and the cabin was built within the 
next year or two. It was PIaintiffs-Rospondonts' interpretation 
that they were building on Lot #128 and that this was what they 
were going to get. In their opinion this was also the inter-
pretation of Mr. Hall and Mr. Rigby who were officers of 
Rimaras, Inc., the corporation who actually owned the property. 
Exhibits #2 and #3 that were identil led, beginning on Page 14, 
line 3, were entered into evidence. Said Exhibit #2 was a letter 
from Mr. Hall to Mr. Garland to which was attached a copy of a 
Deed, Exhibit #3, from Mr. Hall and Mr. Rigby to Mr. Garland of 
Lot #128. The letter stated something to the effect that we 
have sent these to be recorded and in due course of time, the 
recorder will send them to you. At that time there is no question 
that Higb\ and Hall wore ollieers oI Rimaras, Inc. Under those 
conditions, any occupation under the theory of permission by Mr. 
Hall and Mr. Rigby was a consented occupation and was not 
adverse possession. Although it is quite plain that Mr. Hall 
and Mr. Rigby got a deed to Rimaras, inc. to Lot #128 in 1981, 
they did not record the same until 1982. At no time have Mr. 
Hall and/or Mr. Rigby owned the property. At all times they 
have been officers of Rimaras, Inc. Under these conditions, with 
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their consent to occupy the property, it cannot be adverse 
possession but is permitted possession. The Plaintiffs-
Respondents Garland had actual knowledge of Rimaras, Inc.'s 
interest and the parties involved in the same about the 31st 
day of January, 1986, and possibly earlier. In the transcript, 
Page 36, line 12 to line 16, Plaintiffs-Respondents admit that 
they knew then that the property was in the name of Rimaras, 
Inc. And since they did not know that it belong to Rimaras, 
Icn. until that time, the possession could not be adverse until 
that time inasmuch as prior to that time and after that time, 
they occupied the property with the consent of the principal 
officers of Rimaras, Inc. It can never be adverse. 
In an older case in thee State of Utah, quoted in 
Restatement of Property, Section 458, Page 2933, In paragraph J, 
in discussing the open and notorious use and the special rela-
tionship of the same for adverse possession, the following 
statement is found: 
"Where a user of land and one having an 
interest affected by the use have a 
relationship to each other sufficient in 
itself to justify the use, the use is not 
adverse unless knowledge of its adverse 
character is had by the one whose interest 
is affected. The responsibility of bring-
ing this knowledge to him lies upon the 
one making the use." 
In this particular instance, this was not adverse possession, 
it was permitted use inasmuch as the agents of the owner knew that 
it was going on. The adverse user, if there was one, had no 
knowledge that it was an adverse use until the last three years, 
and Rimaras, Inc. consented thereafter because Plaintiffs-
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Respondents expected the officers ot the corporation to clear 
up their title even whey they found out that they had no title 
to the lot in question. 
3. No iiulici a of title. 
Whenever we get into this question of statutory 
adverse possession, we still have to answer the question oi what 
is indicia of title. Under the cases that discuss this are 
Lach v, Deseret Batik, 74(5 P. 2d 802. This case did require that 
the earesf money agreement pertain to the land in question. This 
is a question of a valid earnest money agreement describing the 
property in question that was in existence long before the 
judgment lien came up. In the instance case, we do not have 
this, as Plaintiffs-Respondents Garland's earnest money agree-
ment was for other property. Pertaining to Lot #128, if they 
had any earnest money agreement whatsoever, it was a verbal 
agreement between Plaintiffs-Respondents Garland and the officers 
of Rimaras, Inc. acting in an individual capacity. There was 
only a verbal agreement. This Court must decide whether or not 
it can change the terms of an earnest money agreement by parol 
evidence to make it apply to different property and use it as 
it was used in the Deserejt _Bank case. In the Deseret Bank 
case it obtained judgment liens as set forth in Title 78-22-1, 
Utah Code Annotated, (1953, as amended.) In the case oi^ 
Kartchner v. State Tax Commission and Wyatt, 4 Utah 2d 382, 294 
P.2d 790, which is the case Judge Tibbs relied upon after having 
been reversed on the Lach v. Deseret Bank case quoted above, 
which is the case that establishes that indicia of title may be 
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a non-recorded sale contract. This varies from the case at bar 
by and for the reason that the Kartcdiner sale contract was for 
property on whjch the judgment lien affixed. In the case at bar, 
the conditional sale contract is not on the property in question, 
it is on different property; only by torturing the same in 
violation of the statute of frauds and to say that the verbal 
transaction is to be upheld can you uphold Judge TibbsT decision 
in the instant case. In addition to the Kartchner case used to 
reverse Judge Tibbs on the bach v. Deseret Rank case, the case 
at bar brings in another point entirely away from these two 
cases. That is the question that complies with the statute, the 
question of the conditional sale contract, and in addition, an 
additional point that Plaintiffs-Respondents Garland had not 
paid the taxes. The 1986 taxes had not been paid until 1988 
by an agent of the Defendant-Appellant Fleischmann. Plaintiffs-
Respondents Garland have not paid them yet nor have they 
tendered them. fn the Kartchner case there was a deed which 
predated the judgment lien that had not been recorded. This 
was amplified in the case of Lund v. Donihue, 674 P.2d 107, in 
relation to a divorce. The* deed was made and lost. In any 
event, it was not recorded. In the Lu n d[_v. J^nijnie case, 
it was held that it did not produce .judgment lien because 
the property had already been transferred. In the case at bar, 
we have no instrument in existence as between Plaintiffs-
Respondents Garland and anyone else at anytime that describes 
the land in question. To uphold Judge Tibbs in the case at bar, 
the Appellate Court must take the position that any verbal trans-
action is ahead of the judgment lien, and that the statutes 
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have been followed even though the taxes have not been paid. The 
best we can say about Plaintiffs-Respondents Garland is that they 
were squatters. 
4. Taxes must be paid. 
The payment of taxes encompasses statutory and case 
interpretation and goes back directly to Title 78-12-12, Utah 
Code Annotated, (1953, as amended,) which has previously been 
set forth verbatim herein, to the efiect that taxes must be 
paid. In no case shall adverse possession be considered 
established under the provision of any section ot this code 
unless it shal] be shown that the land has been occupied and 
claimed continuously and that the parties, their predecessors 
and grantors have paid alJ taxes which have been levied and 
assessed upon such land according to law. 
Under the conditions of this particular title, we come 
to the question of the payment ot the 1986 taxes. On cross-
examination, Plaintiff-Respondent Mr. Garland admitted that he 
found out the taxes were delinquent in the spring of 1986, hav-
ing been told so by agents of Rimaras, Inc., to-wit: Mr. Hall 
and Mr. Rigby. He made some sort of contact and paid for the 
five-year period including 1981-1985 inclusive. This was in 
the spring of 1986, immediately prior to the May, 1986 tax sale. 
Upon examination, he admitted that he had not paid the 1986 
taxes although he probably did not know about it and he did 
not know he had not paid them until the question was raised in 
cross-examination. In November, 1987, he paid the 1987 taxes 
only. He admitted that he had not paid the 1986 taxes, and the 
testimony of Mrs. Judy Henrie, Garfield County Treasurer confirmed 
-19-
this: She testified that Defendant-Appellant Miss Anna R. 
Fleischmann through an agent had paid the 1986 taxes. 
This brings us to the question of what does Title 78-12-
12 mean when it talks about payment of taxes for the seven-year 
period. This has been decided many times by the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah. The case of United Park City Miners 
Company v. Clegg, 737 P.2d 173, decided March 31, 1987, to the 
effect that it means payment of taxes, an adverse possession 
suit such as this Garland case at bar was brought. The trial 
court did not find adverse possession. The Supreme Court of 
Utah affirmed the judgment. It was found that the taxes assessed 
on mining claims were jointly on the service on the underground 
and that adverse possession mean nothing without the payment of 
taxes. On Page 175 of the report is a quote, MaLl taxes which 
have been levied and assessed upon such land according to law." 
Under these circumstances, until even on mining claims there can 
be an assessment of the underground and the surface, the law 
is applicable according to the Supreme Court of the State of 
Utah in 1987. One of the head notes makes a finding of the 
Court as follows: 
M6. Adverse Possession: 
One who seeks to acquire title to 
real property, other than by convey-
ance, must comply precisely with 
statutory requirements for doing so. 
What this means to the case at bar is that until the statute 
has been complied with there is no way to get title except by 
conveyance and there has been no conveyance. 
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5. Definition of Color of Title. 
OflentJmos when we are talking about color of title 
and items of this nature, we wonder what we mean. There is a 
quote in Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume 2, Adverse Possession, 
Section 62, Pages 581 and 582, in the last paragraph of this 
Section on Page 582, the following statement appears: 
Registered assurance of title necessary 
to perfect a title by adverse possession 
is not shown by a deed which fails deii-
nitely to include the land claimed. 
The above quoted case of Home Owner's Loan Corp. v. Dudley, 105 
Utah 208, 141 P.2d 160, found that color of title had to be 
based upon some sort of a written instrument. This Home OwnerT s 
Corp. v. Dudley case states to require color of title required 
payment of taxes within the statutory period. This case upheld 
that this method was exclusive. To uphold adverse possession, 
the taxes must be paid during the statutory period. In addition, 
it held that the color of title had to be based upon some sort of 
a written instrument. Putting improvements on adjoining land 
took place to that owned by the quiet title Plaintiff and was 
performed by quiet title Plaintiff and the Court held this was 
not sufficient for a quiet title action without some sort of an 
indicia of title and without the payment of taxes. The Court 
held that the statutory method of proving adverse possession 
was exclusive. In Peterson v. Weber County, 99 Utah 281, 103 
P.2d 652, it was held that a tax deed was sufficient for color 
of title even though there were technical defects in the same 
and it was used as indicia of title or color of title. In 
the discussion of that particular case, there is considerable 
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discussion as what is meant by color of title or something of 
that nature, and the term is finally used by the Court at that 
time as, "apparent title." We do not have anything of that 
nature in the case at bar. 
The current change that the Kartchner case quoted 
above, 4 Utah 2d, 382, 294 P. 2d 790; Luind_y\ ^ on^lhue[, 674 P. 2d 
107; and Lach v. Deseret Bank, 746 P.2d 802, being Court of 
Appeals' case, says pertaining to the color of title, may be 
warranty deed or something of this nature. It states to the 
effect that it still has to be in existence although it may not 
have to have been recorded. These previous cases cover the case 
at bar. There was no color of title in the case at bar as to the 
land in question although there was apparently discussions and 
possibly agreements to change it. This puts us right back to 
the old case of South Pacific v. Tarpey , 51 Utah 107, 168 P. 554, 
to the effect that "one that has a contract and no conveyance 
cannot prevail in adverse possession, and possession before 
conveyance does not count on adverse possession." In the later 
cases, it states that you have to have a contract and that you 
do not have to have a conveyance. Possibly it goes as far as to 
say that the contract does not have to be recorded; however, it 
does have to be in existence. This brings us to the question: 
Without a written contract describing the property and nothing 
that described the property and without payment of taxes, can 
adverse possession be granted? 
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C()NCLtISION 
As the conclusion on this matter, the only item that 
can be drawn is that as pertaining to Lot #128, Tommy Creek 
Subdivision, Mammoth Creek Hanchetts in GariieLd County, Utah, 
this is now the property of De t'endant-Appel 1 ant Miss Anna R. 
Eleischmann by virtue of the judgment sale by which the 
interest of Rimaras, Inc., which was the complete interest 
at that IJ me, was sold to her. This is now past the time of 
redemption. 
Although Plaintiffs-Respondents Garland built a home 
on the property, he did so with consent and under the belief 
that the property belonged to Defendants Rigby and Hall who 
allowed him to do it; they were not in anyway in the frame 
o1 mind that it was adverse. In addition, Plaintiffs-
Respondents have failed to make out questions of adverse 
possession even if they did have indicia of title by the 
failure to pay taxes. A conditional sales contract on other 
land is not indicia ol title. 
Under these conditions, the lirst possession is nxJTT/^' 
made out in the proper forms to Miss Anna R. Eleischmann, 
De fendant-Appellant. 
DATED this / <Viay of January, 1988. 
KespecfuJly submitied, 
PATRICK H. FENTGN1 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
Miss Anna R. Fleischmann 
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MICHAEL W. PARK (2516) 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
110 N. Main, Suite H 
P.O. Box 765 
Cedar City, UT 84720 
Telephone: (801) 586-6532 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
GARFIELD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT G. GARLAND and 
MARY GARLAND, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
FLOYD J. RIGBY, RAY HALL, 
RIMARAS, INC., a Utah 
Corporation, and ANNA R. 
FLEISCHMANN, 
Defendants, 
The above entitled matter came on regularly for hearing on 
Thursday the 6th day of October, 1988, before the Honorable Don 
V. Tibbs, District Court Judge and the Plaintiffs were present 
and represented by their attorney, Michael W. Park and Anna R. 
Fleischmann was represented by her attorney, Patrick H. Fenton 
and the Court having Y ^ arc1 the testimony of the parties and 
having reviewed the exh its and having heard the arguments of 
counsel, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDEREI ADJUDGED AND DECREED that title to the 
following described property located in Garfield County, State of 
Utah is hereby quieted i. favor of Robert G. Garland and Mary 
Garland and against Rimaras, Inc., a Utah Corporation, Anna R. 
Fleischmann and Ray Hall. Said property is located in Garfield 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 86-431 
County, State of Utah and more particularly described as follows: 
All of Lot 128 MAMMOTH CREEK RANCHETTS, TOMMY CREEK UNIT 1, 
a subdivision, according to the Official Plar thereof, 
recorded in the office of the County Recorder of said 
County, 
Rimaras, Inc., a Utah Corporation, Ray Hall and Anna R. 
Fleischmann have no interest in said property. 
DATED this day of October, 1988. 
DON V. TIBBS 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I do hereby certify that on the 13th day of October, 1988, 
I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, first class, 
postage prepaid to Patrick H. Fenton, Attorney at Law, 154 North 
lain Street, Cedar City, UT 84720 and Willard R. Bishop, BISHOP 
& RONNOW, P.O. Box 279, Cedar City, UT ^84720. 
/ 
Secretar 
MICHAEL W. PARK (2516) 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
110 N. Main, Suite H 
P.O. Box 765 
Cedar City, UT 84720 
Telephone: (801) 586-6532 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
GARFIELD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT G. GARLAND and ) 
MARY GARLAND, ) 
Plaintiffs, ) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
VS. ) 
FLOYD J. RIGBY, RAY HALL, ) Civil No. 86-431 
RIMARAS, INC., a Utah ) 
Corporation, and ANNA R. ) 
FLEISCHMANN, ) 
Defendants. ) 
The above entitled matter came on regularly for hearing on 
Thursday the 6th day of October, 1988, before the Honorable Don 
V. Tibbs, District Court Judge and the Plaintiffs were present 
and represented by their attorney, Michael W. Park and Anna R. 
Fleischmann was represented by her attorney, Patrick H. Fenton 
and the Court having heard the testimony of the parties and 
having rev; ./ed the exhibits and having heard the arguments of 
counsel, now makes its findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
1. The Cc rt finds that the Plaintiff purchased property 
from Floyd Rigby and Ray Hall in the area of Mammoth Creek 
Estates, pursuant to a certain earnest money receipt and offer to 
purchase. The Court finds that the Plaintiffs were given the 
option to take a different lot in the Tommy Creek Subdivision and 
Plaintiffs examined the premises and exercised their option to 
purchase lot #128. 
2. The Court finds that the Plaintiffs went into 
possession of lot #128 at Tommy Creek Subdivision in 1981 and 
purchased a cabin kit from Floyd Rigby or Ray Hall and put a 
cabin on lot #128. 
3. The Court finds that the Plaintiffs were in physical 
possession of said cabin on a regular basis until 1986 when 
Plaintiff became ill and could not go to the high altitudes 
because of said illness. 
4. The Court finds that the Plaintiffs received a letter 
from Ray Hall on January 21, 1981, together with a copy of a deed 
and the Defendant, Ray Hall said in his letter that the warranty 
deed would be recorded and that the seller, at that time was Ray 
Hall and Floyd Rigby. 
5. The Court finds that the Plaintiff did not take further 
action until there was notice hat a Sherifffs sale would be held 
on the 11th day of January, 19fc8 and said Sheriff's sale was for 
lot #128, Tommy Creek Subdivision. 
6. The Court 1 : nds that the Plaintiff paid taxes on the 
property for the year 19° .382, 1983, 1984 and 1985. 
7. The Court finds nat the Plaintiff paid the taxes for 
the year 1987 and that th< Ltorney for Anna R, Fleischmann paid 
the taxes for the year 19 J . 
8. The Court fi ds that the attorney for Anna R. 
Fleischmann obtained a JC rment against Rimaras Inc., and filed 
said judgment of record on he 8th day of July, 1985. 
9. The Court finds that the property was noticed for 
Sheriff's sale on January 11, 1988 and that the attorney for Anna 
R. Fleischmann and the attorney for Plaintiffs attended said sale 
and the attorney for Plaintiffs put Fleischmanns on notice that 
the Plaintiffs claimed that they owned all of lot #128 and the 
cabin situated thereon and Fleischmann was put on notice, through 
her attorney, prior to the time of the Sheriff's sale. 
10. The Court finds that the Sheriff's sale took place and 
the Sheriff's deed was issued to Fleischmann on July 12, 1988. 
11. The Court finds that on November 11, 1987, that Floyd 
Rigby wrote to Plaintiffs and told him that he would give Mr. 
Garland a warranty deed from Rimaras, Inc., to Mr. & Mrs. 
Garland, if Mr. Garland would pay certain amounts requested by 
Mr. Rigby as set forth in the letter. The Court finds that Mr. 
Garland refused to pay that amount. 
12. The Court finds that the record title is in the name of 
Mrs. Anna R. Fleischmann, pursuant to a Sheriff's deed and that 
possession of the property is in the Plaintiffs. 
13. The Court finds that Rimaras Inc., is in default and 
asserts no ownership interest in said property and that Ray Hall, 
through his attorney, Willard R. Bishop, does not claim an 
ownership interest in said property. 
14. The Court finds that the case of Kartchner v. State Tax 
Commission, 294 P.2d 790, (Utah 1956) is controlling and that 
the Defendant, Anna R. Fleischmann purchased whatever interest 
Rimaras owned in lot #128 at Tommy Creek Subdivision at Sheriff's 
sale. 
15. The Court finds that Rimaras Inc., did not have any 
ownership interest in the property at the time the Sheriff's 
sale was made.
 ; 
16. The Court finds that to hold otherwise would shock the 
Court and that it would be patently unfair to deliver the real 
property and the cabin to the Defendant Anna R. Fleischmann. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based on the foregoing findings of fact the Court concludes 
that the Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment quieting title to 
said property in favor of Plaintiffs and against the Defendants 
Anna R. Fleischmann, Rimaras Inc., and Ray Hall. 
DATED this day of October, 1988. 
DON V. TIBBS 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I do he : jy certify that on the 13th day of October, 1988, 
I ma. led a true and correct copy of the foregoing, first class, 
postage prepaid to Patrick H. Fenton, Attorney at Law, 154 North 
Main Stre« Cec. ar City, UT 84720 and Willard R. Bishop, BISHOP 
& R0NN0W, .0. Box 279, Cedar City, UT 84720. 
. . . , , • • • • / . : • 
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WARRANTY DEED 
of Cedar City 
CONVEY and WARRANT to 
FLOYD J . RIGBY and R. W. HALL 
, County of Iron 
grantor 
, State of Utah, hereby 
ROBERT G. GARLAND and MARY GARLAND, His Wife 
grantee 
of Henderson, Nevada for the sum of 
$10.00 and other valuable considerat ion -DOLLARS, 
the following described tract of land in 
State of Utah: 
Iron County, 
All of Lot-# 128, TOWY CREEK SUBDIVISION, 
WITNESS, the hand of said grantor , this 
January , A. D. 19 81 
Signed in the Presence of 
20th day of 
STATE OF UTAH, 
County of ™N 
On the 20th day of 
personally appeared before me 
TIo T 7 T o K \ V 1 7 7 / 7 7 ^ ' fir* . * \ X 
"N. Hall "— l^T^Ti •J—w H\ fj, /* M 
O S 
January , A. D. 19 81 
FLOYC J . RI^.Y AND R. W. KALL 
the signer of the within instrument, who duly acknowledge, to me that they executed the 
same. / // V 
^l,,J':^ d'Mf*'. 
My coinnmnion expires. 4-12-83 -Ucsidintf in. 
/ Notary Public. 
Cedar City,/( j tah 84720 
rtLxH* ~ »o t « t n t t ) i i i > - O a i M r t o r o — 
